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Research on the ability of the Telescript™ language and execution mechanism to 
enforce controlled access protection on mobile agents moving in and across distributed 
computer networks has not been published. Nor has General Magic, the creator of the 
language, conducted security testing on their product. 
This thesis investigates whether the mobile agents and execution mechanism 
proposed by General Magic in its Telescript™ language meet the Class C2 Controlled 
Access Protection criteria as promulgated in the Department of Defense Trusted 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC). This was done by conducting an 
analysis of the documentation provided by General Magic in their Telescript™ 
Development Kit (TDK) and Active Web Tools™ (A WT). 
The results of this thesis show that the mobile agents and execution mechanism of 
the Telescript™ language do not meet the criteria for TCSEC Class C2 Controlled Access 
Protection. In particular, the criteria for object reuse, system architecture, system 
integrity, security testing and security documentation are not met. However, 
discretionary access control (DAC) can be enforced using a user-defined security policy 
and the requirements for identification and authentication (I&A) and audit are satisfied. 
v 
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The ability of mobile agents to move in and across distributed networks carrying and 
executing embedded code poses a potential security threat to Department of Defense 
(DoD) trusted computer systems. As mobile agents act with the same permissions and 
privileges as their owners, they must be subject to the same methods of identification and 
authentication that would be imposed upon their owners. Once an agent is welcomed on 
a host computer it must be monitored to ensure that access restrictions are maintained, 
code execution is non-hostile and system resources are not monopolized. Mobile agents 
are different from processes that use remote execution in that the agent can perform tasks 
on its owner's behalf without maintaining continuous communication between itself and 
the owner. The agent acts independently in effect [Ref. 1]. 
Before a distributed network is agent-enabled the system administrator and security 
officer need to understand the operating characteristics and behaviors of mobile agents. 
Care must be taken to configure the host system, particularly the agent-server, to provide 
a secure operating environment. 
The majority of this thesis is devoted to an examination of General Magic's 
Telescript™ Development Kit™ (TDK) and Active Web Tools™ (A WT) to determine if 
they meet the minimum Class C2 requirements for Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
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as established in the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation 
Criteria. (TCSEC). Whereas both of these applications create agents and run-time 
environments for them to be interpreted and executed in, the later is being marketed as 
an agent-enabled web server and is simply an extended version of the former. Both make 
use of the Telescript™ Programming Language. This is an object-oriented, 
communications-centric language specifically designed for carrying out complex 
networking tasks: navigation, transportation, authentication, and so on [Ref. 2]. 
B. BACKGROUND 
What is meant by the term Agent? In general the properties of agents can be defined 
in terms of independence (autonomy), intelligence, communication, learning, mobility 
and representation of the user [Ref. 3]. In current usage the meaning of agent is fairly 
broad and in need of refinement. If an agent is simply a program that performs a task for 
a user, some would argue that a mail daemon is an agent while others prefer to think of 
agents as intelligent actors that traverse networks to negotiate and perform transactions 
on their behalf. For the purpose of this thesis, an agent will demonstrate following 
properties: 
• autonomous: agents operate without the direct intervention of humans 
or others, and have some kind of control over their actions and internal 
state; 
• social ability: agents interact with other agents (and possibly humans) 
via some kind of agent-communication language; 
• reactivity: agents perceive their environment, (which may be the 
physical world, a user via a graphical user interface, a collection of 
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other agents, the Internet , or perhaps all of these combined), and 
respond in a timely fashion to changes that occur in it; 
• pro-activeness: agents do not simply act in response to their 
environment, they are able to exhibit goal-directed behavior by taking 
the initiative. [Ref. 4] 
The agents created with General Magic's TDK and A WT demonstrate all of these 
characteristics and are autonomous or mobile in the sense that they can transfer to any 
Telescript™ enhanced server or client at any time during execution by invoking the go 
command. The agent will then travel, preserving its current state. It may travel to 
another region on the same machine, to a different machine or to any machine that can be 
reached by its network and resume execution. This ability is significantly different from 
using remote procedure calls as the agent does not maintain communications with its 
source machine and it may carry, within itself, the procedure to be executed remotely. 
Rather, it is truly independent in its new environment. Telescript™ Agents are 
significantly more powerful than those found in Sun's Java™ applications. Although 
Java™ displays a level of portability in that it can be moved from one environment to 
another for execution, Java™ programs or applets do not have the ability to move 
themselves. A Java™ program is moved from machine to machine by cooperating 
higher-level programs (servers and browsers); Java™ programs operate as tightly 
controlled subsystems of those higher-level programs [Ref. 3]. 
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C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis will focus on the Telescipt™ and the General Magic paradigm of 
mobile agents. Their agents represent one of the first commercially available agents of 
this sort and appear to be the most capable on the market. 
D. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
This section provides an overview of each chapter's contents. 
1. Introduction 
2. The Telescript ™ Mobile Agent Paradigm 
Chapter II describes the mobile agent paradigm as advanced by General Magic in 
their products. The creation of these agents, their actions, roles, and operating 
environment will be described in detail. 
3. Controlled Access Protection 
Chapter III discusses the Discretionary Access Requirements (DAC) as 
promulgated by the National Computer Security Center to meet the Department of 
Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria. 
4. Controlled Access Protection in Telescript™ 
Chapter IV evaluates whether the agents and operating environment as advanced 
by General Magic meet the discretionary access goals for Criteria Class C2. 
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5. Conclusion 
Chapter V provides a summary of the initial research findings and offers 
recommendations for future research. 
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II. THE TELESCRIPT™ PARADIGM ON MOBILE AGENTS 
A. BASICS 
The Telescript™ paradigm emerged from a conscious effort by General Magic to 
improve the efficiency of computer communications networks. Currently the central 
organizational principle of computer communications networks is remote procedure 
calling (RPC) [Ref. 5, pp. 561-570]. The RPC paradigm uses computer-to-computer 
communications to enable one computer to call procedures in another. Each message that 
the network transports either requests or acknowledges a procedure's performance. A 
request includes data that are the procedure's arguments. The response includes data that 
are its results. The procedure itself is internal to the computer that performs it. Two 
computers whose communication follow the RPC paradigm agree in advance upon the 
effects of each remotely accessible procedure and the types of its arguments and results. 
This agreement constitutes a protocol [Ref. 1, p. 3]. 
A user or client computer with work to perform on a server completes the task 
through a series of remote procedure calls. Each call involves a request sent from user to 
server and a response sent from server to user. The salient characteristic of remote 
procedure calling is that interaction between the user computer and the server entails two 
acts of communication, one to ask the server to perform a procedure, and another to 
acknowledge that the server did so or to return the results of the computation. Thus 
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completion of the task requires ongoing communication. When the task is synchronous 
at the client, time is wasted in the wait state.[Ref. I, p. 4] 
An alternative to remote procedure calling is remote programming 
(RP). The RP paradigm views computer-to-computer communication as 
enabling one computer to not only to call procedures in another, but also 
to provide the procedures to be performed. Each message that the network 
transports comprises a procedure that the receiving computer is to perform 
and data that are its arguments. In an important refinement, the procedure 
is one whose performance the sending computer began or continued, but 
that the receiving computer is to continue; the data are the procedure's 
current state.[Ref. I, p. 4] 
Two computers whose communication follows the RP paradigm 
agree in advance upon instructions that are allowed in a procedure to be 
sent by the user and the types of data that are allowed in its state. Their 
agreements constitute a language. The language includes instructions that 
let the procedure make decisions, examine and modify its state, and, 
importantly, call procedures provided by the receiving computer. Such 
procedure calls are local rather than remote. The procedure and its state 
are termed a mobile agent to emphasize that they represent the sending 
computer even while they are in the receiving computer.[Ref. I, p. 4] 
The striking characteristic of remote programming is that a user computer can 
perform a task on a server without continuous interaction once the network has 
transported an agent between them [Ref. I, p. 4]. 
B. MOBILE AGENT CONCEPTS 
One of the first commercial implementations of the mobile agent concept is 
General Magic's Telescript TMTechnology which allows automated as well as interactive 
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access to a network of computers. The focus of this technology is the Internet-based 
electronic marketplace. 
Telescript ™ technology is implemented with the following principle concepts: 
places, agents, travel, meetings, connections, authorities and permits. 
1. Places 
Any network of computers, regardless of size, is a collection of places. The sum 
of all places under the same authority (the individual or organization that a place or agent 
represents) is termed a region. Places offer services to mobile agents that enter them. 
Servers and clients can both contain one or more places. On each individual machine in 
the network an engine-place contains all other places which may contain sub-places. A 
collection of different machines, each with its own engine-place and associated sub-
places, under the same authority is referred to as a cloud. See Figure 1 on the next page 
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Figure 1. Cloud Configuration in Telescript™ Environment 
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2. Engine 
The engine is a software program or process that implements the Telescript™ 
Language by maintaining and executing places within its control, as well as the agents 
that occupy or enter those places. Normally, there will be only one engine per server. 
Conceptually, the engine is a virtual-machine that runs on top of its host 
computer's operating system. The engine resembles an operating system in that it 
performs process and memory-management, coordinates resources and mediates system-
calls. These similarities will be described in detail later. 
At least conceptually the engine draws upon the resources of its 
host computer through three application program interfaces (APis). A 
storage API allows the engine to access the nonvolatile memory it requires 
to preserve place and agents in case of computer failure. A transport API 
allows the engine to access the communication media that it requires to 
transport agents to and from other engines. An external applications API 
lets the parts of an application written in the Telescript™ language to 
interact with those written in C.[Ref. 1, p. 14] 
3. Agents 
An agent is a process that has the ability to travel between places. Agents can 
perform data collection, conduct transactions or interact with other agents. Each agent 
can inhabit only one place at a time but can move from one place to another, thus 
occupying different places at different times. Agents are independent in that their 
procedures are performed concurrently [Ref. 1, p. 7]. A client may launch multiple agents 
and conversely multiple agents may be active in any place. 
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4. Travel 
The ability of an agent to move from one place to another is termed 'travel' and is 
the resonant feature of a remote programming system. The Telescript™ Language allows 
a computer to package an agent, i.e. its procedures and state, so that it can be transported 
to another computer. The agent itself decides when to travel using the go instruction. 
This instruction requires a ticket, data that specify the agent's destination and other terms 
of the trip. If the trip is successful the agent is unpacked and its next instruction is 
executed at its new destination. In effect, networking is reduced to a single instruction. It 
is important to note however, that it is not necessary or desired for all agents to travel. In 
particular, non-mobile server agents are assigned to places to coordinate the entry of user 
agents and facilitate the use of server services or data. 
5. Meetings 
Any two agents that occupy the same place can meet. A meeting allows the 
agents to call each other's procedures. All meetings are mediated by the engine-process. 
Through meetings, transactions are conducted. Using the meet instruction one agent can 
query another. This meeting requires a petition that states the terms under which a 
meeting can be conducted. These meetings form the core of the electronic marketplace 
envisioned by General Magic. In this marketplace, user agents roam the networks in 
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search of either service or data and accomplish this through meeting with server agents 
programmed to facilitate these services. 
6. Connections 
A connection allows two agents in two different places to make a connection 
between themselves. Use of connections can enable two agents to communicate in a 
manner similar to RPC but this would nullify the principle benefit of agents: reduced 
communications traffic. This feature is currently not available in the current version of 
Telescript™. 
7. Authorities 
The authority of an agent or a place is an attribute that represents the individual or 
organization of the agent or place. Agents and places can discern but can neither 
withhold nor falsify their authorities. The authority of an agent is verified whenever an 
agent travels from one region to another. A region is a collection of places provided by 
computers that are all under the operation of the same authority. If an agent's authority 
cannot be validated at the source destination the agent is denied entry. 
To determine an agent's or place's authority, an agent or place executes the name 
instruction. This instruction returns a telename which denotes the entity's identity as well 
as its authority. Identities distinguish agents or places of the same authority. 
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8. Permits 
Authorities can limit what agents and places can do by assigning permits to them. 
The permit is data that grants capabilities and is an attribute of both places and agents. 
An agent or place can discern its own capabilities and that of others but cannot increase 
them. In addition an agent that can create other agents can't grant those agents 
capabilities that it does not possess itself. 
Permits are used to grant two types of capabilities. One type of permit is used to 
grant the right to execute certain types of instructions. An example of this is the ability to 
create other agents. A permit can also be used to limit the amount of system resources an 
agent or place can consume. 
An agent's effective permit is re-negotiated whenever it travels to another region 
or place within a region. 
In most cases the default permit does not explicitly deny the use of most functions 
of the language and restrictions must be defined explicitly. The primary stated purpose of 
the permits is not for security per se but to prevent processes from monopolizing server 
and communications system resources [Ref. 9, p.78]. 
14 
C. TELESCRIPT™ MOBILE AGENT TECHNOLOGY 
1. Language 
The Telescript™ programming language permits the developers of 
communications applications to write the algorithms that the agent will follow and what 
information it will carry as it traverses a network. Entire applications can be written in 
the language but typically applications are partially written in C/C++. The portions 
written in C/C++ are normally used for the agent-to-user interface and software in servers 
that allow places to interact with databases. The Telescript™ language has the following 
qualities: 
• Complete. The language can be used to express any algorithm. 
Agents. can be programmed to make decisions, handle exceptions, and 
to gather, organize, create and modify information. 
• Object-oriented. The programmer defines classes of information, one 
class inheriting the features of others. Classes of a general nature, such 
as Agent, are predefined by the language. Classes of a specialized 
nature, such as Shopping Agent, are defined by communicating 
application developers. 
• Dynamic. An agent can carry an information object from a place in 
one computer to a place in another. Even if the object's class is 
unknown at the destination the object continues to function: its class 
goes with it. 
• Persistent. Wherever it goes, an agent and the information it carries, 
even the program counter marking its next instruction, are safely 
stored in nonvolatile memory. Thus, the agent persists despite 
computer failures. 
• Portable and Safe. A computer executes [interprets] an agent's 
instructions through a Telescript™ engine, not directly. An agent can 
execute in any computer in which an engine is installed, yet it cannot 
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access directly its processor, memory, file system, or peripheral 
devices. This helps prevent viruses. 
• Communications-centric. Certain instructions in the language, several 
of which have been discussed, let an agent carry out complex 
networking tasks, such as transportation, navigation, authentication, 
access control, and so on. [Ref. 1, pp. 13-14] 
The language demonstrat~s a high level of transparency for the application 
developer. The agents do not have to know where resources are located and can operate 
on any system without direct knowledge of the system (portability) provided a running 
Telescript™ engine process is in place. 
2. Protocols 
The Telescript™ protocol suite enables two engines to 
communicate. Engines communicate in order to transport agents between 
them in response to the 'go' instruction. The protocol suite can operate 
over a wide variety of transport networks, including those based on the 
TCPIIP protocols of the Internet, the X.25 interface of the telephone 
companies, or even electronic mail. The Telescript™ protocols operate at 
two levels. The lower level governs the transport of agents, the higher 
level their encoding and decoding. Loosely speaking, the higher-level 
protocol occupies the presentation and application layers of the seven-
layer Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. [Ref. 1, pp. 13-14] 
The Telescript™ encoding-rules specify how an engine encodes an agent, its 
procedure and state, as binary data and will sometimes omit portions of it to optimize 
performance. These omitted portions are the lessor objects of the Agent class which the 
individual agent does not possess. Although engines are free to maintain agents in 
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different formats for execution, they must employ a standard format for transport. Agents 
are encoded and decoded by all engines using the same rules. 
The Telescript™ platform interconnect protocol specifies how two 
engines first authenticate one another (for example, using public key 
cryptology) and then transfer an agent's encoding from one to the other. 
The protocol is a thin veneer of functionality over that of the underlying 
transport network.[Ref. 1., pp. 15-16] 
D. THE TELESCRIPT™ ENGINE AS A VIRTUAL MACHINE 
1. Telescript™ as an Extended (Virtual Machine) and 
Resource Manager 
As the Telescipt™ engine and engine-place represent a virtual-machine running 
atop the native operating system of the host computer operating system terminology can 
be used to describe its operating characteristics. 
To effect the virtual-machine a script is used to bootstrap an engine-place object 
to represent the running Telescript™ engine. The engine-place is used to set up runtime 
policies, to include security, and provides the environment to instantiate Telescript™ 
processes which correspond to threads in common operating system vernacular. 
Each engine maintains an engine-place at a minimum which represents the engine 
itself and one or more virtual-places that will occupy and execute within the engine place. 
In particular, 
17 
The engine parses (reads) tokens to create objects, then executes 
the objects to build complex objects and perform actions. By saying 
Telescript™ is an interpreted, object-orientated language you are saying 
the language's engine parses its tokens and executes its objects.[Ref. 7, p. 
123] 
2. Processes 
a. The Process Model 
In the Telescript™ process-model a process is a named object capable of 
performing instructions as a self-contained unit. There are two kinds of processes, agent 
and place, which interact by means of features. Features refer to object attributes and 
operations. These features enable one process to convey to another a reference to, a copy 
of, or ownership of an object. 
Upon the direction of the engine a process (thread) moves through three 
distinct phases. In the initialization phase, the engine requests a potential process 
perform an initialize operation. If successful (no exceptions thrown) the process enters a 
live phase instigated by the engine. The live method of a process is simply the executable 
code embedded in it. To begin the live phase the engine requests the object's live 
operation. Completion of a process' live phase, or an uncaught exception causes a 
process to enter the termination phase which marks the end of that process' execution. 
A process can have any number of concurrent activation's and thus 
any number of execution threads. The engine activates a process to 
perform any sponsored operation that the engine requests of a process (for 
example, the 'entering' or 'meeting', as well as the 'live' operation). The 
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activation ceases when the performance ends, whether successfully or 
unsuccessfully.[Ref. 8, p. 10] 
A note of caution; realistically, the number of threads is limited by system 
resources. The maximum number of threads that can be executed before system 
performance becomes an issue is unknown. 
A process (thread) occupies a place within the engine place by entering it. 
The process can enter a place by being constructed by the place itself or by a non-mobile 
agent that resides within the place. Additionally, upon successful completion of the go 
operation , an agent occupies a place by taking a trip there. 
In all cases the engine mediates the entry of a process (thread) to a place 
by requesting the entering operation of the place. If the operation is successful entry 
occurs. Otherwise entry fails and the place's existence can be hidden from or revealed to 
the requesting process at the discretion of the place whose entering operation was 
invoked. 
The engine does not serialize the entry of processes to a place. However, 
places can provide their own serialization and limit the number of processes that are 
active within them as well. 
The Telescript™ engine can maintain multiple processes called places and 
agents. Each process has its own stack and thread of execution. The engine will switch 
among the threads continuously with the effect that the processes appear to execute 
concurrently. 
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The Telescipt™ engine uses a queue to accumulate event signals between 
processes and uses various operations to manipulate them. A priority event can be placed 
at the head of the queue. 
b. Implementation of Processes 
The engine must request an entering operation as defined by Telescript™ 
Class place before an agent or place can occupy a place. Access to a place's features do 
not require the meeting operation whereas any interaction between agents requires use of 
the meeting operation. In all cases, entering or meeting is mediated by the engine. 
c. Interprocess Communication 
An agent cannot interact with another agent remotely. They must occupy 
the same place to meet and part. Two meeting agents occupying the same place can 
conduct a meeting by using the meet operation to gain a reference to the other. Either 
agent can call the part operation which causes the engine to void the references between 
them thus ending the meeting. 
Processes can also interact with one another by using event signals. 
For each process the engine maintains a queue that holds the assigned 
event definitions of all events the process is enabled to receive. [Ref. 7, p. 
211] 
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d. Process Scheduling 
The Telescipt™ engine provides multi-tasking by executing the live 
method of each agent or place independently. The engine schedules the independent 
threads and switches preemptively among them favoring no one process unless that 
process has been granted priority. Threads that are blocked are not scheduled. 
Objects can be dedicated or shared resources to enable threads to perform 
procedures without interruption from other threads. The engine will delay or reschedule 
threads that are competing for unshared resources. 
3. Memory Management 
a. Creation of Objects 
Every object is owned by a process and a process owns itself. Ownership 
of an object grants capabilities to the process that owns it. Owned objects can be copied, 
modified and deleted. Ownership of objects can also be transferred between processes. 
Some operations, including the 'initialize' operation of all objects, 
and the 'live' methods for agents and places don't have to be explicitly 
requested. They are requested by the engine automatically .. .initially when 
object is instantiated, and 'live', as soon as an agent or place is 
successfully initialized. [Ref. 7, p. 128] 
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b. Destruction of Objects 
A process can destroy an object that it owns. If a process wishes to 
destroy an object the engine voids all references to it and its properties. When a process 
is destroyed or ends its live method (finishes execution) all objects it owns are destroyed 
and all references to its objects are voided. 
Memory space is reclaimed when released. The engine performs garbage 
collection on the TelescriptTM Environment Data Store (secondary media) during periods 
oflow system inactivity. This data store is described greater detail in the next section. 
4. Files 
This section specifically refers to the files maintained by the Telescript™ engine 
to perform system initialization and configuration, and system restoration or backup. 
a. Object Persistence 
The Telescript™ engine uses afile-store located on the host's secondary 
media to enable object persistence by storing them in an object-oriented database. 
Objects will survive as long as there are references to them. In the case of system 
shutdown or failure the environment is preserved as the engine takes a snapshot of the 
state of all objects and processes at intervals determined by the region authority for the 
engine. This persistence is not absolute. Although the objects and processes and any 
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communication traffic to and from the engine are committed to the database for 
restoration and playback, scripts (processes) that are using external methods (interaction 
with processes outside of the Telescript™ environment) or the host file system are subject 
to failure due to the non-continuous commit strategy. 
b. Object Restoration 
Objects and processes can be restored with the object-oriented file store 
committed to secondary storage subject to the limitations discussed above. System 
backup and restoration is subject to the policy of the region authority. 
5. System Calls/API's/External Applications 
a. APJ's 
The Telescript™ engine draws upon the resources of its host computer 
through three application programming interfaces (APis). The storage API provides 
access to the computer's non-volatile storage, which the engine uses to preserve places 
and agents in the event of system failure. The transport API provides access to the host 
computer's communication media by which the engine sends agents to and receive agents 
from other engines. The external-applications API lets the processes of the Telescript™ 
Environment interact with non-Telescript™ applications or processes of the host 
computer. [Ref. 8, p. 3] 
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As the engine is designed to support places and agents of different 
authorities it has privileged escapes from the language (available only to the authority of 
the engine) to construct operational, administrative, and managerial (OA&M) tools that 
are external to the engine. 
b. Using system resources and peripheral devices 
Use of system resources and peripheral devices is mediated by the engine 
and access is given only to processes of known authority possessing the proper permits. 
All interaction with the host system is through the external-applications API which is 
controlled by the engine itself. 
c. External Applications 
One of the primary functions of external methods is to transfer and 
translate between data within the Telescript™ environment and data outside of that 
environment. Interaction with a host database is one example. 
6. The Shell - Thumper™ (Engine Control Panel) 
The Thumper™acts as the Telescipt™ cloud's command console. It can be used 
to monitor the activity of all engines within a cloud, restrict or add subscriber privileges, 
24 
modify the behavior of special facilities and services with a cloud and submit custom 
Telescript™ scripts to an engine [Ref. 9, p. 5]. 
a. Starting and Controlling the Engine 
The engine is started as a process on the host system through an 
application interface and is controlled by the Thumper™ as outlined above. 
b. Engine Operations 
Individual engines can be started and stopped using the Thumper™. In 
addition, engines and engine-spaces can be reconfigured from the Thumper™ with some 
limitations. Some changes require there-initialization of the engine from a cold-start. 
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III. CONTROLLED ACCESS PROTECTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the minimal requirements for a system to be assigned a 
Class C2 (Controlled Access Protection) rating for enforcing discretionary access control. 
Most of the quoted material in chapter is taken from the Department of Defense Trusted 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria, hereafter referred to as the "Criteria" [Ref. 10]. In 
each section the requirements may be followed by amplifying remarks and examples 
intended to clarify the requirements. 
B. SECURITY POLICY 
1. Discretionary Access Control 
The TCB shall define and control access between named users and 
named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the ADP system. The 
enforcement mechanism (e.g., self/group/public controls, access control 
lists) shall allow users to specify and control sharing of those objects by 
named individuals, or defmed groups of individuals, or by both, and shall 
provide controls to limit propagation of access rights. The discretionary 
access control mechanism shall, either by explicit user action or by 
default, provide that objects are protected from unauthorized access. 
These access controls shall be capable of including or excluding access to 
the granularity of a single user. Access permission to an object by users 
not already possessing access permission shall only be assigned by 
authorized users. [Ref. 10, p. 15] 
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.__ ___________________ --------
A TCB or Trusted Computer Base is the sum of all protection mechanisms in a 
computer system to include the hardware, firmware and software and is responsible for 
enforcing a security policy. 
Discretionary access control is a method of restricting access to objects, typically 
files and directories, based on the identity of subjects. Subjects are the active entities in 
the computer system normally consisting of programs acting on behalf of the user and 
representing the user's themselves. Examples of subjects include a user entering 
commands at the command-prompt or a word processor application that is attempting to 
open a file. DAC is discretionary in that it permits the subjects to make their objects 
accessible to others leaving the implementation of access controls to the TCB. Users can 
change access control lists for their objects or pass capabilities to other users for access to 
their objects. Users may also make new objects by copying them and can grant access to 
the new objects to a new set of subjects. 
At the C2 Class level of access protection, control of newly created objects must 
not automatically default to public access. Rather, public access to newly created objects 
could be granted using a mask that had been set up in advance by the user. The system 
must have specific rules that limit access to an object to its creator or to a previously 
specified set or subset of users or the system must require the creator of an object to 
specify who will be allowed to access it before he is allowed to create the object. 
Limiting access to the creator of the object is the preferred method [Ref. 11, p. 21]. 
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The mechanism [DAC] must have the ability to include or exclude 
access on a per user basis. If group access controls are provided, groups 
must be precisely defined by listing unique names of users in the groups. 
Hence, groups are made of named users. [Re£ 11, p. 21] 
Named users and objects are uniquely identified to the TCB, i.e. user name, or file 
name, and are used by the DAC mechanism to perform access control decisions. 
2. Object Reuse 
All authorizations to the information contained within a storage 
object shall be revoked prior to initial assignment, allocation or 
reallocation to a subject from the TCB's pool of unused storage objects. 
No information, including encrypted representations of information, 
produced by a prior subject's actions is to be available to any subject that 
obtains access to an object that has been released back to the system. [Ref. 
10, p. 15] 
This requirement means that objects created by a subject in any storage medium 
(main memory, secondary storage, etc.) should not be recoverable when destroyed by the 
user. For example, if an object in memory is de-referenced it is not completely destroyed 
by the elimination of all references to it. The actual media must be overwritten so that the 
original object cannot be reconstructed. The deletion of a file in a DOS based file system 
is a familiar example where the object is not completely destroyed. Deleting a file simply 
removes its reference in the file access table. To be completely destroyed and eliminate 




1. Identification and Authentication (I&A) 
The TCB shall require users to identify themselves to it before 
beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is expected to 
mediate. Furthermore, the TCB shall use a protected mechanism (e.g., 
passwords) to authenticate the user's identity. The TCB shall protect 
authentication data so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user. 
The TCB shall be able to enforce individual accountability by providing 
the capability to uniquely identify each individual ADP system user. The 
TCB shall also provide the capability of associating this identity with all 
auditable actions taken by that individual. [Ref. 10, p. 16] 
If the basis of access to objects in a system is based on the identity of a subject be 
it a user or a group of identified users it is reasonable that a user should be known to the 
system through some means of identification, normally a user name or group ID. 
Additionally the system should be able to authenticate or verify that the users are who 
they claim to be. This is normally done with a passwords, personal information numbers 
(PINs), or like information that can be provided only by the user. 
I&A must distinguish operators, system administrators, and system 
security officers from ordinary users in order to record security related 
events as actions initiated by the individuals performing those roles. Since 
individuals performing those roles may also be ordinary users of the 
system, it's necessary to distinguish the people when acting as ordinary 
users.[Ref. 12, p. 13] 
Ordinary users should not be able to perform security actions nor access the 
database that the DAC mechanism uses to authenticate users. Users who perform 
security functions should be able to log-in with an ID and password that is distinct from 
those used when they are acting as ordinary users. 
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"For identification/authentication events audits the origin of the request (e.g., 
terminal ID) shall be included in the audit" [Ref. 12, p12]. However, if the 
identification/authentication event is across networks, the terminal ID will not be 
available and it must be possible to trace backwards through the network components to 
determine the origin of the login. 
All actions taken by a user must be subject to an audit which matches the process 
action with the ID of the user. All parent and child processes of a user must be 
attributable to that user for audit purposes. That is to say, all process IDs must be 
uniquely related to a user ID. 
2. Audit 
The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from 
modification or unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of 
accesses to the objects it protects. The audit data shall be protected by the 
TCB so that read access to it is limited to those who are authorized for 
audit data. The TCB shall be able to record the following types of events: 
use of identification and authentication mechanisms, introduction of 
objects into a user's address space (e.g., file open, program initiation), 
deletion of objects, and actions taken by computer operators and system 
administrators and/or system security officers, and other security relevant 
events. For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify: date and 
time of the event, user, type of event, and success or failure of the event. 
For identification/authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal 
ID) shall be included in the audit record. For events that introduce an 
object into a user's address space and for object deletion events the audit 
record shall include the name of the object. The ADP system 
administrator shall be able to selectively audit the actions of any one or 
more users based on individual identity. [Ref. 10, p. 16] 
The actions of a user should be traceable by the use of an audit trail. It should be 
possible to bind a subject or user to all actions noted above or that are deemed security 
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relevant by the proper authorities so as to make the users of the system accountable for 
their actions. In Class C2 access control protection the following events should be 
recorded at a minimum [Ref. 13, p. 9]: 
• Use of Identification and authentication mechanisms 
• Introduction of objects into a user's address space 
• Deletions of Objects from a user's address space 
• Actions taken by computer operators and system administrators and/or 
system security administrators 
• Production of printed output 
• All other security events as defined by the system administrators 
In each of the preceding events it must be possible to associate an authenticated 
user ID with each event. Software used to perform the audit as well as the audit trail 
itself, should be protected by the TCB and should be subject to strict access controls. The 
security requirements of the audit mechanism are the following [Ref. 14]: 
• The event recording mechanism should be part of the TCB and as such 
protected from unauthorized modification or circumvention. 
• The audit trail must be protected by the TCB and accessible only to 
audit personnel. It too must be protected from unauthorized 
modification. 
• The ability to enable or disable the event recording mechanism should 
be a part of the TCB and remain inaccessible to unauthorized users. 
One way to protect the audit trail in addition to protecting the audit files by DAC 
is to record them on a device that is designed to be a write-only device or by setting the 
designated device to write-only-once by disabling the read mechanism. Modification of 
data already recorded would be quite difficult as an attacker would not be able to go back 
and read or find the data that they wish to modify. However, a drawback to this method 
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is that the medium must be switched over to a read device introducing a time delay before 
the audit trail can be examined. One way to offset this is to pass copies of all audit 
records to the system security administrator as they are sent to the write-only device. 
However, this medium must be protected at the highest levels afforded by the system. 
[Ref. 13, p. 15] 
D. OPERATIONAL ASSURANCE 
1. System Architecture 
The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution that 
protects it from external interference or tampering (e.g., by modification of 
its code or data structures). Resources controlled by the TCB may be a 
defined subset of the subjects and objects in the ADP system. The TCB 
shall isolate the resources to be protected so that they are subject to the 
access control and auditing requirements. [Ref. 10, p. 16] 
Although systems at the Class C2 level need not be specifically designed for 
security, they must support sound principles of hardware and operating system design, as 
well as support specific security features. Resources should be protected so that they are 
subject to access control and auditing. Examples include putting an access control list on 
the password file and the protection of user files so that they are not accessed by other 
users through accident or design. Privileged programs (such as the auditing program) 
should not be interfered with by user programs [Ref. 15, pp. 134-135]. 
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2. System Integrity 
Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that can be 
used to periodically validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware 
and firmware elements of the TCB. [Ref. 10, p. 17] 
"System integrity means that the hardware and firmware must work and be tested 
to ensure that they keep working." [Ref. 15, p. 136] Some vendors meet the requirement 
for a system integrity test by providing a set of integrity tests which are conducted as a 
regular system exercise whenever the system is powered up. If the tests fail the system 
will not boot. Diagnostics are normally performed during preventive maintenance 
periods. [Ref 15, p. 137] 
E. SECURITY TESTING 
The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested and 
found to work as claimed in the system documentation. Testing shall be 
done to assure that there are no obvious ways for an unauthorized user to 
bypass or otherwise defeat the security protection mechanisms of the TCB 
[Ref. 16]. Testing shall also include a search for obvious flaws that would 
allow violation of resource isolation, or that would permit unauthorized 
access to the audit or authentication data. (See the Security Testing 
guidelines.) [Ref. 10, p. 17] 
The system should be tested to see if it meets its stated security capabilities. 
Particular attention should be paid to the "Identification and Authentication" mechanism 
as this is normally the first line of defense in any TCB. Additionally it should not be 
possible for an unauthorized user to access or alter audit information and authentication 
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data. Systems meeting the requirements of Class C2 should provide some protection 
against human error and preventing and detecting user abuse of authority and direct 
probing. [Ref. I7, p. 6] 
F. DOCUMENTATION 
1. Security Feature User's Guide 
A single summary, chapter, or manual in user documentation shall 
describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB, guidelines on 
their use, and how they interact with one another. [Ref. IO, p. 17] 
2. Trusted Facility Manual 
A manual addressed to the AD P system administrator shall present 
cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when 
running a secure facility. The procedures for examining and maintaining 
the audit files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of 
audit event shall be given. [Ref. I 0, p. I7] 
3. Test Documentation 
The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a document 
that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the security 
mechanisms were tested, and results of the security mechanisms' 
functional testing. [Ref. I 0, I7] 
4. Design Documentation 
Documentation shall be available that provides a description of the 
manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how this 
philosophy is translated into the TCB. If the TCB is composed of distinct 
modules, the interfaces between these modules shall be described. [Ref. 
IO, p. I7] 
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IV. CONTROLLED ACCESS PROTECTION IN 
TELESCRIPTJ'M 
A. SETTING THE STAGE 
Before examining controlled access protection in Telescript™ it is essential to 
understand that although the language and its execution mechanism, the engine, 
incorporate security features that will be discussed in this chapter they were not designed 
to act as trusted software. Accordingly, the Telescript™ system does not explicitly 
enforce any security policy and has no stated security policy model. However it is 
possible to devise a simple model that the Telescript™ could enforce using discretionary 
features (classes) built into the language. 
In the analysis that follows the Telescript™ language and execution mechanism 
are examined to determine to what degree they meet the minimal requirements for 
systems assigned a Class (C2) rating as defined in the Department of Defense Trusted 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria [Ref. 1 0] and explained in Chapter III. 
B. BUILDING A USER-DEFINED SECURITY POLICY 
1. Discretionary Access Control 
As described previously the Telescript™ environment is essentially a process (the 
engine) that runs on top of the host machine. Associated with an engine is an engine 
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place where all other processes (threads) are executed by the engine. Essentially the 
engine only executes two types of processes: agents and places. 
The system administrator builds this environment through a script which is 
actually a collection of classes or objects that will be active in the engine place under the 
system administrator's authority. Generally these objects perform services for host 
subscribers through agent-to-agent or agent-to-place interaction. These services may or 
may not require access to the host applications (e.g. databases) or file systems depending 
on the system's configuration and the service provider's desires. It all depends on the 
nature of the service being provided. It is entirely possible that services can be provided 
that require no access to the host system. When the process (engine) is booted all the 
places and non-mobile agents (which typically provide services) that will exist within the 
engine place are created as threads that are more or less permanent in duration. Once the 
engine process is functional the administrator performs operations, administration and 
management (OA&M) functions through the Thumper™ panel. 
All interaction in the environment is between objects (in the object-oriented sense 
of the word) and is sponsored by the engine in that the engine evokes the 'live' method 
on each object (process or more correctly thread). Thus, some degree of protection is 
provided by object-oriented nature of the language. Object features are made public or 
private at the discretion of the service provider. This affects the get (read) and set (write) 
functions common to all objects regarding their attributes. Additionally, the engine can 
provide protected references between objects making the referenced objects read-only. 
38 
Objects can also inherit features from classes that are specifically designed for 
security. These will be described in more detail later. 
To examine Telescipt in terms of a security policy of controlled access protection 
it is necessary to design a rudimentary security model based on the following 
assumptions: 
• First, all processes (threads) that are created in the engine place by the service 
provider at boot-up (places and non-mobile agents) shall be considered named 
objects. However, these objects will act as subjects when performing actions 
at the request of either subjects under system authority or subjects (agents) not 
under system authority. 
• Second, any processes (threads) or objects created in the engine space at 
behest of the region authority (again, the service provider) will be considered 
named objects. These objects may also act as subjects as outlined in first 
assumption. 
• Third, any host system applications or files will be considered named objects. 
These objects may not act as subjects. 
• Fourth, mobile agents that enter the engine space after proper Identification 
and Authentication or are created by subjects that have entered and occupy 






• Fifth, subjects that are not of region authority (agents) may not interact with 
each other. The reason for this restriction will become more apparent later in 
this discussion. 
• Sixth, subjects access named objects (places) by 'entering' them (being passed 
a reference to the place by the engine) or by having pre-existing or created 
objects passed to them by places (acting as subjects) that they are interacting 
with contingent to the restrictions outlined in the fifth assumption. This 
restriction is necessary because a place may be considered a named subject 
when passing messages to or performing functions on behalf of an agent. 
Therefore, access controls are placed on agents (subjects) not of the region's 
authority that wish to access objects in the service provider's engine place. To enforce 
access controls all objects and subjects must be named and this is accomplished by a 
unique identifier telename which denotes the authority or owner of the process. The 
notion of group controls is not supported. Public controls are supported constructing a 
place that inherits from the AC Public Class (A subgroup of the Access Control Group 
described below). Such places can be made accessible by all agents. 
Access control between the agents and places is done creating places that inherit 
from the Access Control Group of classes. All classes in this group restrict access to 
places created from them to one or more authorities (telenames) and have a requirement 
for a degree of trust in the authentication system. The degree of trust is interpreted 
relative to the policy set by the local region and is system dependent. Additionally the 
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place may require that an agent (subject) provide credentials to access the object (place or 
non-mobile agents). These credentials are provided to individual users by the service 
provider and are data elements known that should be known only by the two of them. In 
effect an access control list can be attached to each object operation that specifies the 
authorities that can use each operation. Propagation of access rights can be prevented by 
disallowing subjects not under system authority to interact with each other. This is 
necessary because the current Telescript™ language does not prevent a subject with the 
proper authority and credentials from passing object references to subjects that do not 
have full access rights to the objects in question nor does it prevent subjects from evoking 
operations of other subjects and using the called subject's operations (the called object 
becomes the sponsor of this operation which is called a sponsored operation) and access 
rights. The calling subject could masquerade as the called subject. However, as subjects 
have the ability to protect their attributes and operations, such an attack would have to be 
cooperative. Remember that interaction between subjects not under system authority 
would require them to occupy the same place. As the language is currently designed, 
both of the subjects could gain entry to the same place but with different access rights to 
the operations of the place. If subjects do not possess the appropriate access rights an 
exception is thrown and entry to a place is denied. 
Agents also carry native permits that are assigned by the agent's author 
(authority). The engine place has a regional permit and all other places have a local 
permit. The regional and local permits are granted by the service provider and limit the 
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actions of agents that enter both the engine place and all other places as appropriate. 
These permits limit the following: 
• age: maximum thread age in seconds. 
• extent: maximum thread size in octets. 
• priority: maximum priority of thread for scheduling by the engine. 
• canCreate: True if the thread can create new processes. 
• can Go: True if the thread can evoke the go operation to travel. 
• can Grant: True if a thread can increase the permit of threads it has created. 
• canDeny: True if a thread can decrease the permit of threads it has created. 
Permits are primarily concerned with resource consumption on the host platform 
and controlling the capabilities of threads. They are not focused on access control but 
they can support a security policy that tries to prevent denial of service. It is also 
important to note that no agent can create another agent with greater access to objects 
than it possesses itself. The effective permit of a thread is the intersection of the native, 
local and regional permits and must be re-negotiated every time an agent enters a new 
place. 
An agent can attempt to gain access to a place by presenting a petition to the 
engine. This petition notifies the engine of the place that it wants to visit by teledress 
and what services are required there. The engine then evokes the entering operation on 
the desired place. If the agent meets the access requirements and possesses the proper 
permit the engine evokes the agents live method and passes a reference to the place to the 
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agent and a reference from the agent to the place. The two threads are then free to call 
each others operations and attributes. Note: Access to host system objects can only be 
done by evoking the operations of objects. Subjects are never given direct access to the 
host system. If the entering operation fails the agent is either terminated, requests to enter 
a different place, or may be sent to another engine via the go operation. Its final fate 
depends on the quality of exception code written into the agent. 
In sum, all interprocess (thread) access is mediated by the Telescript™ engine. 
Operating as a virtual machine atop the host operating system the engine acts similarly to 
a system kernel isolating the threads that it controls from the host. 
The enforcement mechanism (e.g., self/group/public controls, 
access control lists) shall allow users to specify and control sharing of 
objects by named individuals, or defined groups of individuals, or by both, 
and shall provide controls to limit the propagation of access rights. [Ref. 
10, p. 15] 
The primary enforcement mechanism of Telescript™ is the standard protection 
afforded by the object-oriented nature of the language and how it is used with the engine. 
Objects are not created at compilation, as the language is interpreted and all initial objects 
are instantiated when scripts are submitted to the engine at boot up. The telename 
attribute of each subject and object uniquely names each. Within objects, a subject's 
access to operations and attributes is controlled by the use of individual access control 
lists on each. The access lists contain the telenames and credentials of subjects granted 
access to the pertinent operation or attribute. This restriction is quite substantial as it 
restricts access to authorities that are known in advance. The access control lists 
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themselves are attributes of the subjects. Subject attributes are protected by making them 
private data structures, in the object-oriented sense, within the subject. 
Objects in the engine space that are neither agents nor places, i.e. data structures 
or created objects, can be protected by making references to them protected (read-only). 
Additionally, although all objects created by function call, or read, could have an access 
list attached to them, this would be unnecessary as they would not be passed to subjects 
that did not have the proper authority or credentials to make the function calls or reads. 
The propagation of access rights to between named subjects not under system 
authority cannot be prevented unless the subjects are prohibited from interacting with 
each other as stated the previous assumptions. Subjects that call on objects gain the 
access rights of the objects only if they are a named subject and possess the proper 
credentials. 
The discretionary access control mechanism shall, either by 
explicit user action or by default, provide that objects are protected from 
unauthorized access. These access controls shall be capable of including 
or excluding access to the granularity of a single user. [Ref. 10, p. 15] 
Objects are explicitly protected from unauthorized access to the granularity of a 
single user by including (granting) access as identified by a telename with the proper 
credentials. There is no explicit attribute in the Access Control Group of classes to 
exclude access to a single user. 
"Access permission to an object by users not already possessing access 
permission shall only be assigned to authorized users." [Ref. 10, p. 15] 
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This can be done in the Telescript™ environment, but only at great risk and only 
by another subject not under system authority. Surprisingly, this would violate system 
integrity. As a matter of explanation, if a subject (agent) in Telescript™ does not have 
access rights to an object (place) or, its functions and attributes, it should not be assigned 
them by another subject as this would be an unauthorized propagation of access rights. 
Speculatively, if a change in access permission was desired, the engine or subjects under 
its region authority would have to alter the access control list attributes internal to the 
object that the agent wishes to access. Although this can be done by submitting a new 
script for the object, this is not a normal operating procedure during process (engine) 
execution. Regardless, the regional authority can not change the credentials of the 
requesting agent as this attribute would normally be a private attribute of the agent 
created when the agent is instantiated at its host system. Agents may propagate their own 
credentials to any clones they create if the effective permit in the engine space that they 
occupy allows them to clone themselves. Additionally, the credentials of clones created 
by agents would be copies of those possessed by the agents. Propagation of access rights 
is not a normal event in an executing Telescript™ process that is trying to enforce access 
control. 
In summary the propagation of access rights between subjects in Telescript™ can 
be enforced by the security properties of the language and engine if the interaction 
between the subjects not under system authority is proscribed as outlined in previous 
assumptions on building a user-defined security policy. 
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2. Object Reuse in Telescript™ 
No information, including encrypted representations of 
information, produced by a prior subject's actions is to be available to any 
subject that obtains access to an object that has been released back to the 
system [Ref. 10, p. 15] 
In Telescript™, a module, conceivably similar to that in Lisp, automatically keeps 
track of inaccessible blocks and makes them available to be reallocated by returning 
dynamic storage to the heap or permanent storage to the file access table [Ref. 18, p. 
683]. Objects that are created by a subject in any storage medium are reclaimed by 
garbage collection after the subject is terminated. Any objects owned by the subject are 
de-referenced and the medium is released for use by other subjects. The objects are not 
completely destroyed and the possibility of reconstruction is not eliminated as the 
physical space occupied by the objects is not overwritten. Hence the object reuse 
requirement is not met by Telescipt.™ 
C. ACCOUNTABILITY 
1. Identification and Authentication (I&A) 
Agents go from place to place by traveling. To travel an agent provides a ticket to 
the engine of its current region. The ticket contains the telename of an engine in a region 
that the agent wishes to visit. If the agent possesses the proper permit as discussed above 
it is encoded by the sending engine into a what is called a bag of bits and transported to 
the its destination via the available communications infrastructure (CI). Engine to Engine 
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transfer of the agent uses an authentication regime that requires strong mutual 
authentication using RSA public key encryption [PKCS], session key negotiation using 
the Diffie-Hellman algorithm with perfect forward security [DIFFIE], and session 
encryption using RC4. [Ref. 19] When the agent is decoded it is checked for a valid 
telename which identifies its authority or owner. If the telename is valid and the agent 
has the proper regional permit the agent is given a thread of execution. Normally, the 
agent will request an entering or meeting operation as discussed previously. The agent 
will present credentials which act as a token for all intents and purposes. The places 
protect the authentication data making the data a private attribute and the operations used 
to access the data private in a object-oriented manner similar to C++ or Ada. 
Each authority's agents can be uniquely identified by a telename and by an 
internal attribute similar to a process ID when more than one agent of an authority is 
present in a region. Each agent's actions can be audited. This will be described in the 
audit section in greater detail. 
The TCB shall require users to identify themselves to it before 
beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is expected to 
mediate. Furthermore, the TCB shall use a protected mechanism (e.g., 
passwords) to authenticate the user's identity. The TCB shall protect 
authentication data so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user. 
[Ref. 10, p. 16] 
In Telescript™ the agent's sending engine is authenticated prior to identification 
and authentication of the agent. If the sending engine is authenticated then the agent is 
identified and authenticated by its telename (an octet string, issued by General Magic, or 
the service provider) which names the process (thread) and denotes on whose behalf it 
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operates (authority). The authentication data tables are accessible to the engine process 
only. 
The TCB shall be able to enforce individual accountability by 
providing the capability to uniquely identify each individual ADP system 
user. The TCB shall also provide the capability of associating this identity 
with all auditable actions taken by that individual. [Ref. 10, p. 16] 
Each agent (subject) is uniquely identified by telename which is associated with 
all events generated by the logging mechanism in the event record. 
The Identification and Authentication mechanism in Telescript™ meets the 
requirements for Class C2 systems. 
2. Audit 
If a subject's request to enter a place is successful the operation returns an object 
that is a record of occupancy for the place. Using the Thumper™ panel the system 
administrator can determine the occupants of any place. Places keep a list of occupants 
that is updated upon entry and departure of agents. The creation and maintenance of an 
audit trail of all subject accesses can achieved if places inherit from the Logged and Event 
classes. Logging is implemented using event collection points. These objects transfer 
entries to external databases through an external log server that is not accessible by 
subjects in the system. All reportable events are recorded using the Current Process 
Event Id (thread ID) which includes the process telename responsible for the event or 
action. [Ref. 20] Reportable events are declared in an Event Record or OAM Single 
Event object that is created at engine boot-up. If places inherit from the AC Logged class, 
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changes in that place's access controls and attempts to enter the place without the 
required access rights opens a log entry. 
For run time evaluation of the logging system the Thumper™ panel is invaluable. 
Using the panel the system administrator can determine [Ref. 9]: 
• The specific event records and which specified logs they are being dumped to. 
• Open a new event record and log. 
• Stop logging a specific event record. 
• List event records that are generated but are not being logged. 
• Perform additional administrative tasks as required (e.g. adding and removing 
subscribers from the service, restarting engines, killing clouds, etc.). 
The audit logs are examined off-line and an audit trail can be established for each 
thread based on telename included in the Current Process Event Id. The standard log 
entry is a six-tuple that looks like this: <applicationName, transaction/d., authority, 
identity, c/assDigest, current-time> where applicationName is the subject by telename, 
transactionld is the event, authority is as explained elsewhere, classDigest is related to the 
classes carried in the object (object-oriented sense), and current-time is exactly as stated. 
The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from 
modification or unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of 
accesses to the objects it protects. The audit data shall be protected by the 
TCB so that read access to it is limited to those who are authorized for 
audit data. [Ref. 10, p. 16] 
The engine controls access to the event (audit) record for all objects (object-
oriented sense) that have inherited from the Logged and Event classes through an external 
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log server. The log server should be accessible only by those authorized for audit data 
but this is not within the province of Telescript™. Administration of the logs can be 
controlled from the Thumper™ panel as detailed above but detailed analysis is conducted 
off-line. 
The TCB shall be able to record the following types of events: use 
of identification and authentication mechanisms, introduction of objects 
into a user's address space (e.g., file open, program initiation), deletion of 
objects, actions taken by computer operators and system administrators 
and/or system security officers, and other security relevant events. For 
each recorded event, the audit record shall identify: date and time of the 
event, user, type of event, and success or failure of the event. [Ref. 10, p. 
16] 
Telescript™ can log all events prescribed in the proceeding paragraph if the Event 
Record and OA&M Single Event objects are configured properly. The existence of a six-
tuple in the event record as described above is evidence of the success of the event. 
Event failures would be logged in an event record that inherits from OAM Access 
Control Violation (for attempted unauthorized access) or OAM Alarm Event for other 
failures. 
For identification/authentication events the origin of request (e.g., 
terminal ID) shall be included in the audit records. For events that 
introduce an object into a user's address space and for object deletion 
events the audit record shall include the name of the object. The ADP 
system administrator shall be able to selectively audit the actions of any 
one or more users based on individual identity. [Ref. 10, p. 16] 
For identification/authentication requests the origin of the request will always be 
within the engine space. Created or deleted objects can be reflected in the event log. The 
ADP system administrator can selectively audit the actions of any one or more users 
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based on the individual identity provided by the telename field of the six-tuples in the 
event record. 
If the Event Record and OA&M Single Event objects are properly configured by 
the system administrator Telescript™ can meet the Class C2 Audit requirements. 
D. OPERATIONAL ASSURANCE 
1. System Architecture 
"The TCB shall isolate the resources to be protected so that they are subject to the 
access control and auditing requirements." [Ref. 10, p. 16] 
The engine executes in a domain (the engine space) that appears to be secure from 
interference or tampering if the engine is executed as a privileged process. Yet, the 
engine domain can not be said to be secure with any degree of assurance. 
The deliberate decision to interpret rather than execute agent code serves to 
protect the engine from errant or malicious code to some degree as undefined classes are 
not instantiated. With this limitation, code executed must be within the bounds of a 
defmed class under the restrictions of the class definition. Code not recognized by the 
engine is not executed. 
The protection of resources controlled by the engine is more problematic. If the 
subjects, as defined above, are prevented from interacting with each other, there is little 
likelihood that misbehaved agents will gain access to resources that they are not entitled 
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to. All resources in the domain can be isolated and are subject to access control and 
auditing. Therefore, the engine can create domains internal to the engine space. 
It cannot be stated with any degree of assurance that Telescript™ meets the Class 
C2 Operational Assurance criteria for System Architecture. This is unlikely to change 
without examination of the design documentation. 
2. System Integrity 
Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that can be 
used to periodically validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware 
and firmware elements of the TCB. [Ref. 10, p. 17] 
The Telescript™ Developer's Kit comes with scripts that can be used to boot 
engines and create places of limited complexity, capability and utility. The operations of 
these can be checked using the Thumper™ panel and supplied on-line debugger. Scripts 
could be submitted to the engine which create agents that test software features of the 
Telescript™ environment that are security relevant. 
More needs to be done before Telescript™ can satisfy this requirement. 
E. SECURITY TESTING 
"The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested and found to work 
as claimed in the system documentation." [Ref. 10, p. 17] 
Although Telescript™ appears to be designed with security considerations in 
mind, particularly through the inclusion of many classes that relate to access and logging, 
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General Magic makes no claims that the current engine is completely safe. To date, the 
engine implementation has not been through a rigorous security verification or 
certification program. Furthermore, analysis in this thesis has been restricted to a 
rigorous examination of the language and supporting documentation and is not based on 
quantitative tests running the engine on hardware. Scripts could be written to test 
security mechanisms of the ADP system as stated above. 
F. DOCUMENTATION 
1. Security Feature User's Guide 
A single summary, chapter, or manual in user documentation shall 
describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB, guidelines on 
their use, and how they interact with one another. [Ref. 10, p. 17] 
The Telescript™ Programming Guide includes a section on writing secure 
applications [Ref. 21, pp. 75-79] and the Telescript™ Application Library [Ref. 20] is an 
excellent guide to the security classes defined in the language. Additionally there is a 
General Magic White Paper, "An Introduction to Safety and Security in Telescript" [Ref. 
19] which provides further guidance on safety and security considerations in Telescript™ 
programming. 
2. Trusted Facility Manual 
A manual addressed to the ADP system administrator shall present 
cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when 
running a secure facility. [Ref. 10, p. 17] 
There is no Trusted Facility Manual for Telescript™ programming. 
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3. Test Documentation 
See Security Testing section above. 
4. Design Documentation 
Documentation shall be available that provides a description of the 
manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how this 
philosophy is translated into the TCB. [Ref. 10, p. 17] 
The manufacturer's philosophy of protection could only be inferred from the 
limited security material that was available. Since protection was described as relating to 
various levels of 'paranoia' it can only be assumed that the primary emphasis of the 
manufacturer was on making the language communications-oriented and focuses on the 
novel attraction of moving the client (agent) to remote servers (engines). In fairness 
however, the use of interpreted code, and the security features of object-oriented 
programming were stressed and some degree of protection is provided through security 
classes whose use is purely discretionary. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SECURITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT IN TELESCRIPT™ 
This thesis has provided an initial investigation into the capability of the 
Telescript™ language and execution mechanism, the engine, to meet the Class C2 
requirements for discretionary access control. To accomplish this an examination of the 
documentation provided by General Magic in their Telescript™ Development Kit (TDK) 
and Active Web Tools™ (A WT) was conducted. The results of this review were 
correlated with the requirements put forth in the Department of Defense Trusted 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria [Ref. 10]. A more thorough investigation into the 
properties of the Telescript™ language and engine would be difficult to accomplish 
without access to the proprietary source code. 
The General Magic concept of mobile agents and Remote Programming (RP) as 
proposed by Jim White [Ref. 1] is an exciting one and is already being used in Magic 
Mail™ personal communication applications but serious security issues remain unsolved. 
The commercial novelty and benefits of using mobile agents has over-shadowed security 
concerns. 
This is not to say that security has been completely overlooked in Telescript.™ 
However, the current version of Telescript™ does not meet all of the Class C2 
requirements for discretionary access control. By using the Telescript™ language's built-
in Access Control Class it is possible to limit the propagation of access rights between 
55 
subjects if a user-defined security policy is built using the assumptions outlined in 
Chapter IV. The requirement for accountability in terms of identification and 
authentication and audit can be met using the Telescript™ language's built-in classes. 
The Telescript™ language and execution mechanism can not be said to be operationally 
secure in terms of system architecture and integrity with any degree of assurance. 
Finally, security testing needs to be done and security documentation is lacking. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Follow-on work to this thesis should include testing the Telescript™ execution 
mechanism (engine) by: 
• Setting up a stand alone network as a region under a single authority with 
engines running each individual machine in the network. 
• Creating places in each engine space, each with different access requirements. 
Some places would access system resources. 
• Building agents of different authority that attempt to penetrate places and 
obtain references to objects or system resources that they do not have the 
access rights to. 
Similar work should be done on other languages that support mobile agent like 
behavior. Candidates for this work include Java™ and TCL. 
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